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CURRAN V. MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER &
SMITH, INC.: THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF AN
IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE
COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
Many federal statutes outline the rights and duties of individuals. A number of these statutes, however, fail to indicate whether
Congress intended for a private individual to enforce-these rights
and duties through the courts.1 To compensate for this absence of
statutory intent, courts have developed the doctrine of implied private rights of action.2 The Supreme Court first held in 1916 that
private rights of action may be implied from certain statutes.3 This
doctrine gained in utility in the early 1960's when the Supreme
Court held that lower courts may imply private actions as a remedy when necessary to supplement or to effect the congressional
purpose behind a statute.4
Beginning in 1975, the doctrine underwent rapid evolution." In
Cort v. Ash,' the Court announced a four factor test for determining whether an implied private action exists under a silent statute:7
1. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). Section 1681 states: "No person in the United States
shall, on the bases of sex .... be subjected to discrimination under any education program."
Id.
2. See, e.g., J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
3. See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
4. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964).
5. "[lt suffices to say that in a series of cases since Borak we have adhered to a stricter
standard for the implication of private causes of action." Touche Ross Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 578 (1979). See generally Frankhauser, Private Actions Under the Commodity
Exchange Act: Implying Less and Enjoying It More, 35 Bus. LAw. 847 (1980).
6. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
7. One must take care to differentiate between the question of who may enforce a statutory right and the question of who may enforce a right protected by the Constitution. In
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), the plaintiff brought a sex discrimination suit
against her former employer, claiming a private right of action for damages for a violation of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The federal court of appeals applied the four
factor Cort test and concluded the plaintiff did not have an implied private right of action
under the fifth amendment. Id. at 232.
The Supreme Court held that the use of the Cort test to determine the existence of a
private right of action under the Constitution was erroneous. Id. at 241. The Court distinguished statutory rights and obligations established by Congress from the provisions of the
Constitution. In determining whether an implied right of action exists under a statute, a
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(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose especial benefit Congress enacted the statute; (2) whether the legislative history
of the statute indicates any legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create or deny a remedy; (3) whether the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme are consistent with the implication
of such a remedy for the plaintiff; (4) whether the cause of action
is one traditionally relegated to state law.8
The Court employed Cort's analytical framework for several
years,9 but soon renewed its efforts to restrict the implication of
private rights of action. In a series of cases decided in 1979,10 the
Supreme Court undertook a refinement of Cort. While not eliminating the four prong Cort analysis,1 the Court did determine that
the second Cort question, whether Congress intended to create a
private action, was "dispositive."' 2 A failure to find such intent
would render the other questions irrelevant.' 3 Consequently, the
Court elevated the consideration of a statute's legislative history to
4
a position of paramount importance in the determination process.
This rapid change in the doctrine 1 5 has left the lower federal
courts with an unsettled method of analysis. The restriction of the
Cort analysis, without guidance as to how to determine intent,

court should focus on the intent of Congress to create a right in favor of a certain class of
people. Id. In determining whether litigants may enforce a right granted by the Constitution, however, the Court held that a determination of congressional intent becomes unnecessary and noted that the ability of the people to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts for
violations of constitutional rights already exists. Id. at 242. Accord, Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See generally Comment, Loe v. Armistead: The Availability of an Alternative Remedy as a Bar to Extending Bivens, 20 WM. & MARY L. REv. 393
(1979); Note, Implied Rights of Action to Enforce Civil Rights: The Case for a Sympathetic
View, 87 YALE L.J. 1378 (1978).
8. 422 U.S. at 78.
9. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
10. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
11. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689-709 (1979).
12. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979).
13. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979).
14. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979).
15. During 1979 alone, the Court handed down at least six different decisions that discussed the doctrine in some way. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).

1981]

CEA IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION

gives little direction to lower courts in determining whether to imply a right of action."'
Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc.17 exemplifies the confusion of lower courts in determining when to imply
-a private right of actioxf. Curran involved a claim of an implied
right of action under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) 18 in
light of 1974 amendments to the act. Prior to 1974, courts granted
plaintiffs an implied right of action under the CEA.19 The 1974
amendments, however, established the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 20 and gave it the power to operate an administrative reparation procedure that enabled individual investors to recover for injuries resulting from violations of the CEA.21
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a
divided decision in Curran, held that an implied private right of
action under the CEA was still available to private investors. 22 In
arriving at its decision, the court used a hybrid analysis, involving
both an examination of the legislative history of the amendments
23
to discern intent and an application of the four factor Cort test.
This Comment will analyze the circuit court's use of both an intent
inquiry and a Cort analysis in light of recent Supreme Court pronouncements, and will submit that this dual analysis reflects the
contradictory nature of the most recent Supreme Court decisions
concerning implied rights of action.

16. See generally Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action under Federal Law, 55
NOTRE DAm LAW. 33 (1979); Underwood, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis:
An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Definition of an Implied Right of Action, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 533 (1980); Note, A New Directionfor Implied Causes of Action, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 505 (1980).
17. 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980).
18. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976).
19. For discussion of pre-1974 cases, see note 68 & accompanying text infra.
20. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389
(amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976)).
21. 7 U.S.C. §§ 18(a), (e) (1976). The reparation procedure also enabled investors to recover for violations of CFTC rules and various exchange rules. Id. § 18(a). For discussion of
the legislative history of the CFTC Act, see notes 126-131 & accompanying text infra. The
availability of private remedies through the CFTC raised the question of whether the implied right of action survived the 1974 amendments. See note 61 infra.
22. 622 F.2d at 236. In July 1980, the Second Circuit became the second federal court of
appeals to rule on the survival question. Leist v. Simplot, 2 COMM. FUT. L. RFP. (CCH)
T 21,051 (2d Cir. July 8, 1980).
23. 622 F.2d at 233.
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Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
In Curran, the plaintiffs, a married couple, invested in defendant Merrill Lynch's "Guided Commodities Account Program" in
1973. The program involved commodity trading accounts through
which individuals invested in the futures commodity market under
the defendant's supervision and guidance.24 Plaintiffs opened the
first of several accounts with an investment of $100,000. Although
at first the plaintiffs did realize substantial profits,25 their accounts
began to decline in value.28 Plaintiff finally "cashed out" of the
program with a claimed loss of $175,000 in April of 1974.27
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the defendant induced them to
open an account through misrepresentations and that the defendant subsequently mismanaged the account.28 Specifically, plaintiffs alleged violations by the defendant of sections 5 and 12(2) of
the Securities Act of 1933 for failure to file a registration statement
before making an offer and sale of a security.2 Plaintiffs further
alleged fraudulent misrepresentations in violation of section 17(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933, 80 section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193431 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,32
24. Id. at 219. A key question of fact in the case concerned the mechanical operation of
the program. Merrill Lynch contended that, under the program, clients would deposit a
certain amount of money in individual commodity trading accounts. Id. at 220. Defendant
said that although its agents would recommend specific purchases and sales of commodities,
the ultimate decision to act rested with the client. Id.
Contrary to the defendant's description of the program, plaintiffs claimed the defendant
had represented the program as containing several unique elements: (1) a specific number of
investors constituted the program and could not withdraw their investments for 18 months;
(2) an individual trader controlled the operation of all the investments and in doing so could
control market fluctuations; and (3) the combined buying power of the aggregate investments gave the trader buying power five times greater than an individual investment. For
purposes of the appeal only, defendant conceded that the handling of plaintiffs' accounts
was discretionary, with trading control being the responsibility of the defendant. Id.
For a discussion of commodities investment accounts in general, see Bromberg, Commodities Law and Securities Law-Overlaps and Preemptions, 1 J. CoRP. L. 217 (1976).
25. The plaintiff at one point withdrew over $100,000. 622 F.2d at 220.
26. At the time the plaintiffs closed the accounts, their capital had fallen to approximately $6,000. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. See note 24 supra.
29. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 5, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 771(2) (1976).
30. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976).
31. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
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section 410(a)(2) of the Michigan Uniform Securities Act,"3 section

6b of the CEA, ' and the common law.35
The district court granted partial summary judgment to the defendant, ruling that the accounts were not securities and that
therefore the complained of actions did not fall within the purview
of federal securities law.8" Consequently, the court dismissed plain-

tiffs' security claims for failure to state a cause of action.3 7 The
court also stayed plaintiffs' fraud claims under the CEA because of
a mandatory arbitration clause in plaintiffs' investment contract.3 8
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs'
claims involving federal securities law,-9 but reversed and remanded the order staying plaintiffs' fraud claims under the CEA.'0
The court determined that Regulation 180.341 adopted by the
CFTC in 1976, should apply retroactively to invalidate the arbitration agreement in the investment contract.' 2 Remand of the case to
the district court prompted the Sixth Circuit to examine sua
sponte whether the district court had jurisdiction to entertain a
claim based upon an implied right of action under the CEA.'3

32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
33. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.810 (1967).
34. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976).
35. 622 F.2d at 219.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 218.
39. The decision of the court concerning federal securities law is not the subject of this
Comment.
40. 622 F.2d at 229.
41. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3 (1980). The regulation provides, inter alia, that a customer must
agree to arbitration voluntarily, but no voluntary agreement occurred in Curran.622 F.2d at
226-27.
42. For an expansive discussion on the retroactivity of Regulation 180.3, see Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 567 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1977).
43. 622 F.2d at 230-32. The court held that remand of the case to the district court necessitated an examination of the availability of an implied right of action under the CEA after
the 1974 amendments because further delay would result from an adverse ruling by the
district court on this issue. Id. at 230.
The court recognized that its review of an interlocutory order normally should involve
only "the narrow question of whether the district court abused its discretion and [that it
should] refrain from intruding into the merits of the case." Id. at 230 n.17 (citing Alexander
v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978)). The court
construed this principle, however, to be a rule of orderly judicial administration and not to
be a limit on jurisdictional power. According to the court, this jurisdictional power permits
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The court focused its initial inquiry on the legislative history of
the 1974 amendments. Finding no evidence of an express congressional intent to extinguish the implied right of action," the court
then considered the congressional purpose behind the
amendments.
Prior to 1974, self regulation by the commodity exchanges chiefly served to enforce the CEA in tandem with enforcement by implied private rights of action. By 1974, however, the self-enforcement system began to break down."5 This weakening of the selfregulatory system, the court found, prompted Congress to enact a
more comprehensive regulatory scheme."6 The court further found
that Congress had intended through the amendments to end jurisdictional disputes between the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the Commodities Exchange Commission (CEC) as well
as to ensure the CFTC's integrity as an administrative body. 7
Moreover, the court emphasized that the remarks of the sponsors of the amendments indicated that Congress believed the
CFTC would not interfere with implied private actions under the
CEA.' 8 Noted also by the court was the language of the 1974
amendments that "'nothing in this section shall supersede or limit
the jurisdiction conferred on the courts..
. . ,"s
, Finally, the court
indicated that the CFTC itself never regarded the amendments as
abolishing or precluding implied private actions. 50 The court thus

the consideration of those "aspects of [an] order which would not be independently reviewable by interlocutory appeal." Id. See also Mannsbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d
1017 (6th Cir. 1979).
The events that formed the basis of plaintiff's complaint occurred prior to the 1974
amendments to the CEA, although plaintiff had filed the claim in 1976. Pre-1974 cases permitted an implied right of action under the CEA. See note 68 & accompanying text infra.
The court in Curran,however, determined that" 'a court is to apply the law in effect at the
time it renders its decision.' " 622 F.2d at 230, n.19 (quoting Bradley v. Richmond School
Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)). The court thus determined that survival of an implied right
of action after the 1974 amendments would be an issue on remand.
44. "The [CFTC] Act did not speak to the continuing validity of the pre-existing private
right of action." 622 F.2d at 231-32.
45. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. 46-48 (1974).
46. 622 F.2d at 231-32.
47. Id. at 232.
48. Id. For a discussion of the remarks of the sponsors of the 1974 amendments, see notes
126-130 & accompanying text infra.
49. Id. See 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
50. 622 F.2d at 232. See 41 Fed. Reg. 18,471 (1976). The court in Currannoted, however,
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concluded that "Congress intended to extend further protection
*

.

. , rather than to extinguish existing forms of protection."51

Despite its affirmative findings on congressional intent, the court
engaged in further analysis, using the Cort four factor test.52 First,
the plaintiffs, as private commodities investors, were members of
the class for whose benefit Congress had enacted the statute. 3
Clearly, Congress intended to protect individuals such as the plaintiffs from the hardships of market manipulation." Second, the legislative history of the amendments demonstrated congressional
awareness of implied private actions under the CEA and Congress's desire to preserve them." Third, implied private actions
stood in a position of compatibility with the underlying legislative
scheme.5 Fourth, the implication of a private right of action would
not infringe on the states because commodities regulation is a matter of federal, and not state, concern.5 7 The court therefore concluded that the action could be implied under the requirements of
Cort5 8
that it could not give great weight to the CFTC's opinion because of the Supreme Court's

decision in Piper v. Chris-Craft 'Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). That opinion indicated that
the deference given by the courts to an agency's interpretation of a statute is not to be
extended to the issue of implication of a cause of action. Id. at 44 n.27.
51. 622 F.2d at 232.
52. Id. at 233.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 30,466 (remarks of Sen. Dole); id. at 34,998-99 (remarks of
Sen. Clark).
55. 622 F.2d at 234.
56. Id. at 234-35. The court based its conclusion on compatibility mostly on CFTC regulations intended to harmonize the administrative reparations procedure with implied actions.
Id. at 235. But see note 50 supra.
57. 622 F.2d at 235.
58. The court went on to determine that the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction would not bar the present action. Id. at 235-36. Generally, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction requires that a party first resort to an administrative agency before he may sue
on an issue within the competency of that agency. See Armour & Co. v. Alton R.R., 312 U.S.
195 (1941); Convisser, Primary Jurisdiction:The Rule and its Rationalizations, 65 YALE
L.J. 315 (1956).
In Curran,the court declined to apply the doctrine on the ground that the preservation of
an implied right of action would not interfere with the rulemaking power of the CFTC and
would not impinge on the orderly development of precedent by the agency. Id. at 235-36. To
reach this decision, the court focused mainly on the need for the special expertise of the
CFTC. This examination centered on two prior cases concerning the Commodity Exchange
Commission and requests by that agency for stays of private actions. Chicago Mercantile
Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973); Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289
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Judge Phillips dissented on the ground that Congress failed to
specify its intent to continue to allow private actions despite the
creation of an administrative reparations procedure.59 He asserted
that recent decisions by the Supreme Court compelled a finding of
express statutory intent in the language of the statute before a private right of action could be granted.6 0
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Curran reflects the uncertainty
that has plagued other federal courts.6 1 This uncertainty centers on
the method of analysis that courts should apply to determine
whether an implied right of action exists under a silent statute.
IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION

The Supreme Court first held that certain statutes impliedly au-

(1973).
In Ricci, the plaintiff, a member of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, brought an antitrust suit against the exchange in federal district court, alleging violations of both federal
antitrust laws and the CEA. 409 U.S. at 290-91. The Supreme Court held that the action
should be stayed in order for the CEC to determine the relationship between the CEA and
the antitrust laws. Id. at 302. This determination constituted a material aid to the district
court's adjudication, according to the Court. Id. at 305.
In Deaktor, two different plaintiffs charged the defendants, the Chicago Board of Trade
and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, with market manipulation, violations of the CEA,
and violations of the rules of the Exchange. 414 U.S. at 113. The defendants moved for a
stay of the actions in order to give the CEC an opportunity to form an opinion as to which
rules and statutes were being violated. Id. at 114. The Court ordered the proceedings stayed,
holding that the plaintiffs initially should have been "routed ... to the agency whose administrative functions appear to encompass adjudication of the kind of substantive claims
made. . . ." Id. at 113.
The Sixth Circuit distinguished the Ricci and Deaktorcases, in which technical and intricate facts pervaded the plaintiffs' claim, from cases like Curranthat raise only conventional
fraud claims. 622 F.2d at 236. This interpretation relied largely on an administrative assessment of private actions under the CEA by the CFTC. Id. But see note 50 & accompanying
text supra.
59. 622 F.2d at 237 (Phillips, J., dissenting in part).
60. Id.
61. Some courts have held that a private right of action remains available under the CEA,
see Leist v. Simplot, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,051 (2d Cir. July 8, 1980); R.J.
Herely & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co., 466 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Jones v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 466 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1979); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill.
1979), but 'other courts have held that no implied right of action exists under the CEA,
Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Liang v. Hunt, 477 F. Supp.
891 (N.D. IMI.1979); National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 470 F.
Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd sub noma. Leist v. Simplot, 2 CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1
21,051 (2d Cir. July 8, 1980).
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thorize private rights of action in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v.
Rigsby.2 In outlining the requirement for implying an action, the
Court in Rigsby stated: "A disregard of the command of [a] statute
is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover... damages ... is implied ....
"s For nearly fifty years
after Rigsby, the Supreme Court implied a private cause of action
from only one statute." The implied right of action doctrine
reemerged in the early 1960's when, in J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 5 the
Court developed a two prong analysis for determining. whether a
silent statute implied a private right of action.
The first prong required a determination of whether the plaintiff
was a member of the class meant to be benefitted by the statute."'
The second prong involved a determination of whether the implication of a remedy was necessary to effect the congressional purpose behind the statute.6 7 Using the two prong analysis, federal
courts in the late 1960's determined that an implied private right
of action existed under the CEA. s

62. 241 U.S. 33 (1916). In Rigsby, the plaintiff, a railroad employee, brought an action
against his employer, alleging violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act of 1903, 45
U.S.C. § 14 (1976). The statute provided only a criminal penalty for violations. 241 U.S. at
39.
63. 241 U.S. at 39. Justice Powell, dissenting in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677 (1979), argued that Rigsby was not truly an implied right of action case. Rather, Rigsby
was a tort action removed to federal court, and the Court only used the federal statute to
define the relevant standard of care under the federal common law doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 441 U.S. at 732 (Powell, J., dissenting).
64. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (implying an action under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976)).
65. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). Borak involved a stockholder who charged his company's management with effecting a merger through the use of false proxy statements. Id. at 429. He
claimed a right to a private action for damages under a section of the federal securities law
that provided only a criminal penalty. Id. at 432.
66. Id. at 429.
67. The Court found that one of the chief purposes of the statute was the protection of
private investors. This purpose, said the Court, implied the availability of judicial relief to
achieve the result desired by Congress. Id. at 432. Moreover, the Court determined that
private actions can augment the administrative functions of regulatory agencies and that
courts "should be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the
congressional purpose." Id. at 433. For further discussion of the Borak case, see O'Neil,
Public Regulation and PrivateRights of Action, 52 CALiF. L. REV.231 (1964); Note, Private
Rights of Action for Commodity Futures Investors, 55 B.U. L. Rav. 804 (1975).
68. See, e.g., Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Serv., 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970); Arnold
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Although several decisions indicated that the Court intended to
abandon the two prong test, 9 the actual reformulation did not occur until the landmark case of Cort v. Ash.70 In Cort, the plaintiff,
a stockholder in Bethlehem Steel Corporation, brought a private
action for damages against the president of the corporation for political advertisements paid for by Bethlehem. The plaintiff based
his claim on the Federal Election Campaign Act," which provided
only a criminal penalty for unauthorized contributions to political
campaigns by corporations. In determining whether to imply an
action, the Court brought together prior case law to create the four
factor test for determining whether an implied right of action existed under a silent statute: (1) whether plaintiff is a member of
the class to be benefitted; (2) whether the legislature intended a
remedy; (3) whether an implied remedy is consistent with the purpose of the legislation; and (4) whether the area traditionally has
been relegated to state law. 2
Following Cort, the Supreme Court employed the four factor test
in several decisions. s In 1979, however, the Court issued three
v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 61 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Johnson v. Arthur Epsey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp.
1338 (E.D. La. 1972); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l., 311 F. Supp. 1375 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
69. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers (Amtrak), 414 U.S. 453
(1974). These two cases presaged the emergence of legislative intent as a key aspect in implying rights of action. For example, in Amtrak, the Court applied both a rule of statutory
construction, namely that the expression of a remedy excludes other remedies, and an examination of legislative history to determine that it could not infer a private right of action.
414 U.S. at 458-65.
70. 422 U.S. 66 (1976).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1976).
72. 422 U.S. at 78. The Court amalgamated the class to be benefitted doctrine of Texas &
Pac. R.R. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), the legislative intent requirements of National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers (Amtrak), 414 U.S. 453 (1974), the
consistency with legislative purpose standard of J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964),
and the traditional area of state law limitation of Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
The Court in Cort held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the Campaign Act met
any of the four prongs of the test, and thus denied a right of action. 422 U.S. at 83.
73. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). In Pueblo, the plaintiff, an American Indian, brought an action for
damages against her tribe based on the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 13011303 (1976). Although the Court found that the plaintiff was a member of the class Congress
sought to benefit, the Court held that her action failed to pass the Cort test. 436 U.S. at 64.
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opinions that called into question the continued validity of the
Cort analysis. The first decision, Cannon v. University of Chicago,7 4 declared that an implied private right of action was available under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. 75
In Cannon, the Court undertook a detailed analysis of the four
Cort factors,7 e and concluded that all four factors supported implication of a private action.77 The last paragraph of the opinion,
however, indicated uneasiness with the doctrine of implied rights
of action 7 and revealed the Court's preference for statutory language that provides an express remedy. 79 Although noting that in
certain "limited circumstances" the failure of Congress to provide
express language is not inconsistent with the implication of a private remedy,"" the Court concluded by stating that Title IX was an
"atypical situation" in that it fulfilled all four Cort factors.8 "
The restraining spirit of Cannon appeared again in the Court's
opinion in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington. 2 In Redington, the
Court held that an investment broker's customers did not have an
implied right of action for damages against the firm's accountants
under federal securities law. 83
The clear intent of Congress to prevent judicial intrusions into tribal sovereignty precluded
the implication of an implied right of action. Id. at 60.
In Piper,the plaintiff, a large corporation, attempted to buy out the defendant, a smaller
competitor, through stock purchases. 430 U.S. at 4. When plaintiff's efforts failed, it brought
suit alleging violations of federal securities law. Id. at 9. The Court applied the Cort analysis
and concluded that the plaintiff had failed to meet any of the four requirements. Id. at 37.
See Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the Williams Act after Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on
Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAw. 117 (1978).
74. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
75. Id. at 679. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
76. 441 U.S. at 689-709.
77. Id. at 709.
78. Id. at 717. Some commentators assert that the last paragraph in Cannon may have
been added to induce Justices Stewart and Rehnquist to concur in the Court's decision. See
Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action under FederalLaw, 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 33,
38 (1979). In his concurrence, Justice Rehnquist admonished Congress to express its intentions more clearly, and stated "that the ball, so to speak, may well now be in [Congress']
court." 441 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
79. 441 U.S. at 717.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
83. Specifically, the plaintiff in Redington claimed a private right of action under § 17(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1976). This section requires an
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In response to the plaintiff's argument that an examination of all
four Cort factors would result in a finding in favor of implication,
the Court stated that the four Cort factors did not carry equal
weight in the analysis. 4 Rather, the inquiry should focus on
whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action. 5 Unless a plaintiff can demonstrate that he is one of the class sought to be benefitted by a statute and that the history of the statute reflects unambiguous
congressional intent to grant a private right of action, the courts
must not imply one.8 8
In essence, the Court interposed the first two prongs of Cort as
threshold criteria requiring affirmative answers before other factors
undergo consideration. 7 Furthermore, the Court refined those two
prongs. Whether the plaintiff was a member of an especial class for
whose benefit the statute was enacted now became an inquiry into
whether the statute created a federal right in favor of a private
party or prohibited a certain mode of conduct.8 8 As for determining legislative intent, the Court stated that implication is less appropriate when a silent statute is contained within an act in which
other sections provide express private remedies.8 9 When Congress
desired to create a private remedy, "it knew how to do so and did
so expressly."9 0

investment firm to file annual reports of the firm's financial condition with the SEC. As a
receiver presiding over the liquidation of an investment firm, the plaintiff alleged that defendant accountants violated § 17(a) by performing an improper audit of the investment
firm's records. 442 U.S. at 565-66. The plaintiff claimed that the improper audit breached a
duty the defendant owed the plaintiff and the firm's customers. Id.
84. 442 U.S. at 575.
85. Id. The first three factors of the Cort analysis, said the Court, constitute the factors
traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent. Id. at 575-76.
86. Id.
87. In Redington, consistency of the implied right of action with the statutory scheme,
the third Cort factor, did not receive equal consideration with the first two factors. Id. at
577-78. The Court's primary concern focused on the legislative history of the statute and
whether a certain class of plaintiffs were benefitted. Id. at 576; see Underwood, supra note
16; Note, Implied Causes of Action: A Product of Statutory Construction or the Federal
Common Law Power?, 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 355 (1980).
88. 442 U.S. at 569. In this case, the Court held, § 17 simply required the filing of reports
with the SEC; the section set no standards and established no duties to private parties. Id.
89. Id. at 571, 572. The Court developed this principal in National R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers (Amtrak), 414 U.S. 453 (1974). See note 69 supra.
90. 442 U.S. at 572. For a discussion of the conflict between this principle and the Court's
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The Court reiterated its emphasis on a threshold inquiry into
the question of congressional intent in Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis.91 In Lewis, the plaintiff, a shareholder in a
mortgage trust association, brought a derivative action against the
trust and several investment firms that served as advisors to the
trust.9 He claimed the defendants committed fraud and breached
fiduciary duties owed to shareholders in violation of section 206 of
the Investment Advisors Act.93 The plaintiffs reasserted the argument used in Redington that the Court could not confine its analysis to an examination of intent, but also must consider the utility
of the private remedy desired as well as whether the area is one
traditionally relegated to state law." This argument met with flat
rejection because the Court again focused on the first two Cort factors.9 5 Although conceding that section 206 proscribed unlawful
conduct, thus crossing the first hurdle of creating an especial class
to benefit, the Court held that legislative history and statutory
construction evidenced no intent by Congress to create a private
right of action.90 "The dispositive question remains whether Congress intended to create any such [private action]. Having answered that question in the negative, [the Court's] inquiry is at an

end.,'*7

In his dissent, Justice White asserted that the Court's refusal to
apply the Cort test ended the analysis in Lewis prematurely. 98 He
argued that all four prongs of Cort are the criteria to discern congressional intent and that the Court may reach no conclusions on
intent until it examines each of the four factors. 99
decision in Cannon, see notes 138-140 & accompanying text infra.
91. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).

92. Id. at 13.
93. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
94. 444 U.S. at 23.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

23-24.
19-22.
24.
26-27 (White, J., dissenting).

99. Id. Justice White concluded that an implied right of action existed under the Invest-

ment Advisors Act. Id. at 36. Also contrary to the majority, White believed that the statutory language evidenced congressional intent to create a private action. Id. at 28-29.
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The decisions of Lewis and Redington have divided the circuits
in the method of analysis they employ to determine whether a
statute supports an implied right of action. The First Circuit has
adopted an analysis similar to the analysis used in Curran.Ie° The
Fifth Circuit has concluded that it would use Cort, but that the
ultimate duty is to determine congressional intent. 101 According to
that court, "even if satisfied that some of the Cort factors supported implying such a right, [the court] could not do so if unconvinced that Congress intended such a remedy."1 02 In a post-Redington case, the Seventh Circuit said that the central inquiry is
congressional intent, but proceeded to apply the Cort test.103 The
Ninth Circuit, however, has disregarded Cort entirely and has engaged in a new one-step analysis that examines only the legislative
history of the subject statute.'"
The Sixth Circuit has been inconsistent in its application of the
Redington and Lewis decisions. In Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 105 the

court held that an implied right of action did not exist under the
100. Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 509 (1st Cir. 1979). Plaintiff claimed an implied
right of action under the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750g (1976). He alleged
that the defendants, several federal agencies, violated the provisions of the Act that concern
mortgage rates. 607 F.2d at 509. Although the court found no statutory language that either
created federal rights in favor of private parties or proscribed behavior, as in Redington, the
court still proceeded to apply the Cort test. Id. at 509-10. The Cort test also yielded a
negative result. Id. at 510.
101. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980). In Rogers, the plaintiff, a
handicapped individual, brought suit against his former employer, a federal contractor,
under § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976). The Act requires contractors
performing work for the federal government to take steps to employ qualified handicapped
persons. The court refused to imply an action under § 793. 611 F.2d at 1085.
102. 611 F.2d at 1078 (citing Lewis and Redington).
103. City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979).
In Evansville, the court refused to imply a private right of action under the Rivers and
Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976).
104. Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980). In Jablon, the plaintiff, a
private investor, sought to base her action against defendant, a stock broker, upon both
SEC rules and the rules of the New York Stock Exchange. 614 F.2d at 678. The Ninth
Circuit recognized that Lewis and Redington reflect a restrictive approach to the doctrine of
implied rights of action. Id. at 679. For this reason, the court considered only the question
of congressional intent and did not even cite Cort in its opinion.
105. 611 F.2d 1170 (6th Cir. 1979).
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Bankruptcy Act.106 Following the Redington analysis, 10 7 the court
held that when Congress confers private remedies in certain sections of an act and omits private remedies from other sections, a
finding of an implied right of action is precluded under the silent
sections.108 In Chumney v. Nixon,10 9 however, the court, in holding
that an implied right of action was available under the Federal
Aviation Act," used the intent inquiry only as one factor of the
Cort test, and placed equal emphasis on the other three factors.,
As stated previously, the question of the continued existence of
an implied right of action under the CEA has divided the lower
federal courts.11 2 In the recent decision of Leist v. Simplot,115 the
Second Circuit became the second federal court of appeals to rule
expressly on the survival of the private right of action after the

1974 amendments to the CEA. 114 The court conducted an analysis
similar to that used in Curran, declaring that Redington gave the
question of congressional intent controlling weight, 5 yet still ap-

106. Id. at 1177.
107. See notes 82-90 & accompanying text supra.
108. 611 F.2d at 1177. Although the court did engage in a right of action analysis, what
the plaintiffs actually were seeking was the inference of a substantive right. See C. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 17, at 67 (3d. ed. 1976).
109. 615 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1980).
110. The Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1976).
111. 615 F.2d at 394. The court stated that "[in. ..recent cases (including Redington
and Lewis) the Supreme Court has repeatedly followed and emphasized the Cart test." Id.
112. See note 61 supra.
113. 2 COMM. Fur. L. REP. 21,051 (2d Cir. July 8, 1980).
114. In a recent decision, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that an implied right of action under the CEA no longer exists. Rivers v. Rosenthal
& Co., 634 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1980). The court's analysis focused on the question of congressional intent as the "dispositive inquiry" under Redington and Lewis. Id. at 781, 782. Although the court considered the same legislative history that the court in Curran said reflected favorable legislative intent, the Fifth Circuit determined that these "few fleeting
references" constituted insufficient grounds for holding that an implied right of action survived the 1974 amendments. Id. at 786.
In Ames v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 567 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1977), and
Case & Co. v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 523 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1975), the courts presumed
the existence of a private remedy under the CEA.
115. 2 COMM. Fur. L. REP. 21,051, at 24,177. In an interesting twist on the Redington
approach that if Congress wished to created a remedy, it knew how to do so expressly, the
courin Simplot posited that Congress knew of prior decisions implying a remedy, and
therefore, if Congress wished to deny the implied right of action, it ought to have said so
expressly. Id. at 24,173, 24,181.
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plying the four factor Cort test.1 1 In accord with Curran, the Second Circuit concluded that a private action should be implied. 1 7
A district court decision on which both Curran and Simplot relied was Smith v. Groover."" In Smith, the court concentrated its
preliminary analysis on the legislative history of the amendments. 119 Based on this examination, the court suggested that Con12 0
gress had not intended to eliminate the implied right of action.
The court then turned to the Cort analysis and found that each
121
factor generated a positive response.

Curran IN

LIGHT OF

Redington AND Lewis

In Curran, the court felt compelled to subject the plaintiffs'
claim to the Cort test. 22 Prior to its Cort analysis, however, the
court conducted a thorough inquiry into congressional intent. 2
Although the Sixth Circuit never expressly addressed the recent
modifications of Cort, it took care to make its analysis fall within
24
the parameters of Redington and Lewis.
The opinions in Lewis and Redington placed controlling weight
on congressional intent as ascertained from the legislative history
of the subject statute.2 5 In regard to the CEA, an intent inquiry
yields a favorable finding. The congressional sponsors of the 1974
amendments said on several occasions that the powers given to the
CFTC were "not intended to interfere with the courts in any

116. Id. at 24,173.
117. Id. at 24,189.
118. 468 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Il. 1979).
119. Id. at 108-12. Unlike the plaintiffs in Curran,the plaintiffs in Smith represented the
buyers and sellers of soybean futures at the Chicago Board of Trade. Id. at 107. They alleged that the defendants, commodities brokers, engaged in price manipulation in violation
of the CEA. Id.; see 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-13 (1976).
120. 468 F. Supp. at 111-12.
121. Id. at 112-15.
122. 622 F.2d 216, 233 (6th Cir. 1980).
123. Id. at 231-32.
124. This concern would explain the court's detailed inquiry into the legislative history of
the amendments. Id. at 231-32. The same concern motivated the Second Circuit to conduct
an even greater inquiry in Leist v. Simplot 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. T 21,051, at 24,177 (2d Cir.
1980).
125. See notes 82-97 & accompanying text supra. See also Frankhauser, Private Actions
Under the Commodity Exchange Act: Implying Less and Enjoying it More, 35 Bus. LAW.
847 (1980).
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way." 126 Speaking on behalf of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Senator Talmadge said the amendments hopefully would lighten the burden on the courts, but simultaneously
not infringe on their jurisdiction.12 7 The intention not to disturb
the jurisdiction of the courts found expression in the amendment
language that "[niothing in this section shall supersede or limit the
jurisdiction conferred on the courts of the United States or any
128
state."
Nonetheless, one should also note negative expressions of congressional intent. In 1973, Congress failed to approve three proposed amendments to the CEA that contained provisions for private damage remedies for aggrieved investors. 29 As correctly
stated by the court in Smith v. Groover, however, these amendments provided treble damages for CEA-violations and are therefore distinguishable from the 1974 amendments. 130 Under the analysis formulated in Redington and Lewis, "what must ultimately be
determined is whether Congress intended to create the private
remedy asserted."13 1 With congressional intent the ultimate issue,
the Sixth Circuit's application of the four factor Cort test after a
positive finding of intent 3 2 appears superfluous. The first two Cort
factors, benefitted class and legislative intent, comprise the new
Redington-Lewis analysis. 3 The third factor, consistency with
purpose, from the old Borak approach,13 4 possibly is now unimportant. In a recent decision, Justice Rehnquist appended a footnote
to his dissent declaring that the Court's decisions in Redington
and Lewis destroyed the remnants of the Borak two prong test. 135
Likewise, the final factor, whether the area is traditionally relegated to state law, should be immaterial in the face of a finding of
126. 120 CONG. REC. 30,459 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Talmadge).

127. Id.
128.
129.
(1973);
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
H.R. 11,195, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. § 17(3) (1973); S. 2837, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 505
S. 2578, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. § 20(3) (1973).
468 F. Supp. 105, 113 (N.D. IM. 1979).
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979).
622 F.2d at 233-35.
See notes 87-90 & accompanying text supra.
See note 72 & accompanying text supra.
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 39-40 n.5 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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congressional intent. 18 6
Additional analysis using Cort, however, is reconcilable with the
Redington-Lewis analysis. The contradictions between the Supreme Court's decisions in Cannon and Redington necessarily generate further analysis of a questionable right of action. In Redington, the Court declared that it would be less likely to imply a
private action from a statute when other sections of the same statutory scheme contain express private remedies. 137 In Cannon, however, the Court held that the presence of other sections of a complicated statutory scheme to provide express remedies should not
prove fatal to the implication of a private remedy from a silent
section. 38 Moreover, in Cannon the Court said that only an explicit congressional intent to deny a cause of action would be controlling.13 9 In Redington, however, the Court declared that when a
statute is silent or ambiguous as to congressional intent, a prospective plaintiff cannot rely on the general remedial character of the
statute to establish a cause of action. 40
The divergent Redington and Cannon opinions placed the court
in Curran in a difficult position. An examination of congressional
intent by the court produced a finding favorable to an implied
right of action;14 1 however, the court based this finding in part
upon evidence that the purpose of the 1974 amendments was essentially remedial." 2 In addition, other sections of the CEA statutory scheme provided private remedies through the use of an administrative reparations procedure.1 43 Conceivably, different
results would obtain, depending on whether a court focused on
Cannon or Redington as a mode of analysis. Using the four prong
Cort test, the court buttressed a favorable, yet less than definitive
finding of congressional intent with evidence of consistency with
underlying purposes and of noninterference with state regula-

136. If Congress intends to imply a private cause of action, and it has that power, whether
states have legislated in the area is of no moment. Congress may preempt the area.
137. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1979).
138. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 711 (1979).
139. Id. at 694.
140. 442 U.S. at 578.
141. See notes 126-27 & accompanying text supra.
142. See notes 45-46 & accompanying text supra.
143. See 7 U.S.C. § 18(e) (1976).
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tion,1" perhaps believing that this aggregate result would offset the
negative findings, under Redington, of remedial purpose and existence of other remedies.
CONCLUSION

A federal court potentially can select from one of three methods
of analysis in order to determine whether a silent statute supports
an implied right of action. The Redington-Lewis method centers
on a finding of favorable legislative intent, both from the face of
the statute and from the legislative history. Under this approach,
145
the problem of reconciliation with Cannon still remains.
The second method, the one chosen by the court in Curran,aug146
ments the Redington focus on intent with the Cort analysis.
When a court reaches the conclusion that it can garner an implied
cause of action explicitly or implicitly from the legislative history,
then it weighs the Cort test against any negative findings produced
1 47
from the Redington inquiry.
Finally, a court may select the analytical framework'discussed by
Justice White in his dissent in Lewis.14 Justice White asserted
that the Cort test as an entirety determines the presence of legislative intent.1 49 Although the second prong of Cort speaks directly to
the question of intent, the other three prongs also constitute "criteria through which.
intent can be discerned." 150 Adoption of
this mode of analysis by the federal courts would do much to clarify the doctrine of implied rights of action." First, this analysis
would provide a methodical approach to the problem of ascertaining congressional intent. Second, the inquiry into whether the pro-

144. 622 F.2d 216, 234-35 (6th Cir. 1980).
145. See notes 137-40 & accompanying text supra.
146. See notes 141-44 & accompanying text supra.
147. Of course, the possibility exists of no negative findings under Redington, making the
balancing process unnecessary. Even the "atypical" statute referred to in Cannon,see notes
75-81 & accompanying text supra, however, may come into conflict with some of the principles enunciated in Redington. See notes 137-44 & accompanying text supra.
148. 444 U.S. 11, 25 (1979) (White, J., dissenting).

149. Id. at 27.
150. Id. (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979)).
151. Although Justice White's method of analysis seems new in light of the Lewis and
Redington decisions, the analysis constitutes only an updated version of the Cort four factor
test.
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posed cause of action is consistent with the congressional purpose
behind the statute would answer the questions of whether a statute
is remedial in character or whether a statutory scheme provides
express remedies.52 Most importantly, however, the analysis would
provide a uniform test that all federal courts could apply.
The court in Curran arrived at the proper result when it concluded that an implied right of action remains available under the
CEA. The legislative history of the 1974 amendments provided
clear evidence that Congress intended to preserve the implied private remedy. This evidence is certainly sufficient to satisfy the
method of analysis established by the Supreme Court in the cases
of Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington and Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis.
J. R. H.

152. 444 U.S. at 25 (White, J., dissenting).

